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Australian governments have recently moved from cash accounting to accrual 
accounting. This paper discusses a number of issues pertaining to key accrual fiscal 
measures. Governments have adopted Australian Accounting Standard 31 as their 
principle accounting framework, relegating the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ 
alternative GFS accrual framework to a secondary role. AAS and GFS differ in key 
respects in the derivation of the operating result. This paper suggests that the ABS 
framework is superior, and should have been adopted by government. 
 
Rather than welcoming the shift to accrual accounting as a good opportunity to shift 
the focus of medium-term fiscal policy away a narrow preoccupation with ‘cash’ 
balanced budgets and debt, governments have chosen to maintain policy continuity. 
This has led them to define new ‘headline’ fiscal measures which are either identical, 
or quite close, to the cash budget balance. This Commonwealth’s new ‘fiscal balance’ 
headline measure is discussed. 
 1. Introduction 
 
Over the past couple of years, Australian Governments have been progressively 
implementing accrual accounting in their general government (ie budget) sectors. As a 
result, Australia has now joined the handful of countries in which accrual accounting 
has assumed the role formerly played by traditional so-called ‘cash’ accounting. 
Victoria was the first Australian government to bring down a fully accrual budget, in 
fiscal year 1998-99. The Commonwealth and most other states followed in 1999-
2000. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has followed a similar timetable in 
placing its Government Finance Statistics (GFS) series on a full accrual footing from 
1999. 
 
In presenting their budgets, governments have generally followed Australian 
Accounting Standard (AAS) 31. The accrual methodology of the new GFS 
presentation differs in certain respects from AAS 31 methodology, although in other 
important respects the two coincide. 
 
2. The Context 
 
Australian Governments have since the late 1980s been preoccupied with the 
reduction of the stock of public debt as the primary objective of medium term fiscal 
policy, and most of them have set explicit net debt
1 reduction targets. Consistent with 
this, the centrepiece of their medium-term fiscal policies has in most cases been a 
fiscal rule expressed in terms of the ‘cash’ (ie cash accounting) budget balance. 
Traditionally, the cash budget balance was defined as ‘cash’ revenue (ie payments 
received other than via the sale of bonds) minus expenditure (payments made other 
than for the purchase or redemption of bonds)
2. Thus defined, the cash budget balance 
measures government net lending, and is equal to the reduction in nominal net public 
debt, excluding ‘revaluations’ of the stock of debt. Debt revaluations refer to changes 
in the market value of debt instruments which do not reflect any underlying lending 
transaction. They arise principally from changes in expected interest rates and, in the 
case of foreign-currency debt, changes in exchange rates. Thus it can be said that, as 
traditionally defined, the cash budget balance is the flow counterpart of the net debt 
stock measure, with the precise ‘articulation’ of stock and flow measures being broken 
by revalutions. 
 
Thus, for example, it was the cash budget balance which the federal Coalition 
government had in mind when, upon coming into office in 1996, it declared that its 
overarching fiscal rule was to ‘achieve underlying budget balance on average over the 
business cycle’. Similarly, to take one other example, the principle medium-term 
fiscal rule now being applied in New South Wales is that ‘the Budget should be at 
least balanced (on a GFS cash basis) over the course of a full business cycle’, 
notwithstanding that the primary medium-term objective is zero net debt by 2020. 
 
Although most governments have explicit net debt targets, medium-term fiscal rules 
expressed in terms of the flow measure (the cash budget balance) have had primacy 
over targets expressed in terms of the stock measure (net debt). There are a number of 
reasons for this. One is the impact upon debt of revaluations, which are both volatile 
and beyond the immediate control of policy-makers. By setting the medium-term  3
fiscal rule in terms of the cash budget balance, policy-makers avoid the distorting 
impact of debt revaluations. It is also relevant that it was easy to adjust the cash 
accounting flow measure in response to the widespread reaction against the use of 
privatisation receipts by governments in the early 1990s to artificially reduce reported 
cash budget deficits. The ‘underlying’ budget balance referred to in the federal 
Coalition’s fiscal rule is an adjusted version of the cash budget balance in which 
privatisation receipts and other ‘net advances’ are treated as equivalent to borrowing 
(ie as ‘financing transactions’) rather than as equivalent to revenue
3. 
 
In an accrual accounting context, the statement of financial flows reports the 
‘operating result’ rather than the cash budget balance. The introduction of accrual 
accounting within the general government sector therefore raised the question of the 
status of the cash budget balance as the headline fiscal measure. In the 1999-2000 
Commonwealth budget a new fiscal measure the fiscal balance was introduced, 
and the Coalition’s central fiscal objective of ‘underlying budget balance on average 
over the business cycle’ was reformulated as a requirement for ‘fiscal balance, on 
average, over the course of the business cycle’ (Treasury, 1999a: 1.14). Although the 
cash budget balance continues to be reported because of its significance for short-run 
stabilisation policy, the fiscal balance is now regarded as the ‘headline’ fiscal 
measure. As discussed below, the fiscal balance is derived through adjustments to the 
operating result which have the effect of producing a measure which is quite close to 
the underlying cash balance. Indeed, Treasury regards fiscal balance as ‘the accrual 
counterpart of the underlying cash balance’ and takes the view that, like the cash 
balance, it ‘measures the Government’s contribution to net lending’. The shift to this 
new headline fiscal indicator has not been accompanied by any rethinking of medium 
term fiscal policy. Rather, the emphasis is upon policy continuity (Treasury, 1999b, 2, 
3, 8, 19). 
 
Although at time of writing no state has adopted the fiscal balance measure, many 
have done what is in effect the same thing by announcing targets for the operating 
result the achievement of which is approximately equivalent to the achievement of 
zero fiscal balance and to underlying cash balance. In Victoria, for example, the 1998-
99 budget announced that the centrepiece of it budgetary policy would be the 
achievement of what it refers to as a required operating surplus. In the same year, 
South Australia announced a target operating surplus. 
 
3. Fiscal Balance and Net Financial Assets 
 
Fiscal balance is defined as the operating result before abnormals, plus revaluations, 
minus capital adjustments. The operating result before abnormals is an AAS 31 
concept. AAS 31 requires the presentation both of an operating result before 
abnormals and an operating result after abnormals. It is, however, the former which is 
regarded as more meaningful, and in Commonwealth budget documentation the 
operating result before abnormals is simply referred to in shorthand as the ‘operating 
result’. This shorthand is also adopted in the discussion below.  
 
A word of explanation is required in relation the two adjustments made to the 
operating result to derive the fiscal balance. The, first, the ‘capital adjustment’, equals 
capital expenditure minus depreciation: in other words, net investment. The second,  4
‘revaluations’, has a broader meaning in the accrual context than in the cash 
accounting context: it encompasses not only the debt revaluations mentioned above, 
but also revaluations which affect other balance sheet liabilities (eg superannuation) 
and assets (including physical assets and equity holdings). AAS 31 requires that 
revaluations be treated as ‘above the line’ items which enter into the computation of 
the operating result before abnormals. Adding revaluations has the effect of 
eliminating revaluations from the fiscal balance. Treasury argues that this is 
appropriate because revaluations ‘do not reflect changes in the Government’s resource 
position’ (Treasury, 1999b: 13; 1999a: 1.30). While one can agree with this position, 
it raises the question of why AAS 31 includes revaluations in the operating result in 
the first place. This issue is further discussed below. 
 
Fiscal balance is also a concept in the GFS framework, although in that framework it 
is termed net lending (ABS, 1997: 9). The primary GFS operating result concept is the 
net operating result. By contrast to the AAS 31 operating result, the GFS net 
operating result excludes revaluations, which it considers to be a type of abnormal. It 
is therefore not necessary to adjust the GFS net operating result in order to eliminate 
revaluations in the derivation of net lending. 
 
To clarify the difference between the fiscal balance and the cash balance, we make the 
simplifying assumption that (other than revaluations) there are no abnormals, so that 
 
Operating result before abnormals = Increase in Net Assets 
 = Increase in Net Financial Assets + Increase in Net Non-Financial Assets 
 
The distinction between financial and non-financial assets is not to be found in the 
accounting standards or in government accounts: it is introduced here for analytic 
purposes. Non-financial assets are assets which are part of the capital stock (ie which 
are created by expenditure which is classified as capital expenditure). Principally, 
these take the form of fixed capital and land. All other assets and liabilites are 
considered to be ‘financial’. This latter category includes not only money and bonds, 
but also accounts receivable/payable, tax revenue which has been determined to be 
payable but has not yet been received and employee entitlements (the most important 
of which is superannuation liabilities). Importantly, it also includes government 
holdings of shares held for investments. Net financial assets is therefore a broader 




Net Investment = Increase in Net Non-Financial Assets + Revaluations of Net 
  Non-Financial Assets 
 
So that (if ‘net financial liabilities’ is defined as a measure equivalent, but opposite in 
sign, to net financial assets) 
 
Fiscal Balance = Increase in Net Financial Assets (NFA) + Revaluations of NFA 
          = Reduction in Net Financial Liabilities (NFL) - Revaluations of NFL 
  5
Whereas (if for simplicity we ignore any adjustments to the cash balance to eliminate 
net advances) 
 
Cash Budget Balance = Reduction in Net Debt - Revaluations of Net Debt 
 
Thus whereas the stock counterpart of the cash budget balance is net debt (where the 
full ‘articulation’ of stock and flow is broken by revaluations), the stock counterpart 
of fiscal balance is net financial liabilities (again with revaluations breaking full 
articulation). The difference between the cash budget balance and the fiscal balance is 
the flow counterpart of the difference between the two stock measures net debt and 
net financial liabilities. 
 
Potentially, there might be a significant difference between targeting zero fiscal 
balance and zero cash balance. Viewed in stock terms, net liabilities are significantly 
larger that net debt. The most important difference between the two is employee 
liabilities, by far the most important component of which is superannuation liabilities. 
As an approximation, we could say that the change in net liabilities equals the change 
in net debt plus the change in employee liabilities. The annual change in employee 
liabilities tends not to be trivial. For 1999-2000, for example, the projected quantum 
was $1.156 billion (Treasury, 1999a: 4.15). This would suggest that the shift to 
targeting zero fiscal balance might represent a tightening of fiscal policy of non-trivial 
dimensions. Clearly, however, this depends upon a range of factors, including trends 
in public employment levels. 
 
In practice, the projected difference between fiscal balance and cash balance at the 
Commonwealth level over the next couple of years is on average not great, and is 
significantly less than the amount of the increase in employee liabilities. This reflects 
the joint impact of a number of other lesser cash-to-accrual adjustments, the detail of 
which cannot be explored here for reasons of space. Suffice it to say that a number of 
the adjustment factors concerned are ‘one off’ in nature, so that the difference could 
become greater in future. Overall, it is not clear that it is justifiable to downplay the 
difference in the manner of the Commonwealth Treasury (Treasury, 1999a:11.14; 
1999b, p 12). 
 
4. The Significance of the Operating Result 
 
In the private sector, accrual accounting originally arose precisely because of the 
meaninglessness of the ‘cash’ financial result. For a commercial enterprise to report 
annual profit by debiting expenditure undertaken during the year from cash revenues 
would be a complete nonsense. It would mean, for example, that any capital 
expenditure undertaken would directly reduce reported profit. The operating result in 
an accrual framework deals with this problem by calculating profits differently: 
expenses (expenditure attributable to that year, irrespective of when it takes place) are 
subtracted from accrual revenue (revenue attributable to that year). The operating 
result is, obviously, the most important measure in private sector financial 
reporting the ‘headline’ measure, one might say. 
 
It may be seen as somewhat paradoxical, then, that Australian governments which are 
enthusiastically adopting accrual accounting, and which are so enthusiastic about re- 6
modelling the public sector more along private sector line, do not appear to view the 
government operating result as a meaningful fiscal measure. Instead, these 
governments have continued to focus either upon the cash balance as their headline 
measure, or upon the closely-related quasi-cash/quasi-accrual fiscal balance concept. 
 
There is a considerable degree of consensus, encompassing governments and 
economic analysts, about the two central goals of medium term fiscal policy: namely, 
intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability. Fiscal sustainability might be defined 
as the avoidance of fiscal policy settings which, if maintained over time, would 
ultimately result in the burden of financial obligations rising to levels which would 
lead government to default, and which at some point prior to that would lead to a loss 
of confidence on the part of potential lenders. 
 
A third, more recent, medium term fiscal policy goal which has received considerable 
(although by no means universal) support has, of course, been the enhancement of 
national saving. 
 
In targeting the reduction or elimination of debt, Australian governments have 
believed themselves to be simultaneously pursuing both intergenerational equity and 
fiscal sustainability. The Commonwealth, for example, has made intergenerational 
equity an express criteria for the monitoring of fiscal policy under its Charter of 
Budget Honesty, and rationalises its rule requiring budget balance over the business 
cycle as a means whereby to ‘ensure that future generations are not left with a rising 
public debt burden’ (Treasury, 1999b: 7). 
 
There is, however, an alternative perspective on the meaning of intergenerational 
equity, which is embodied in the so-called ‘golden rule’. The golden rule can be taken, 
in a shorthand way
4, to assert that taxpayers in each time period should ‘pay their 
way’, in the sense that they should as a group pay for all expenditure from which they 
benefit, without requiring any subsidy from taxpayers in other time periods. The 
golden rule requires the contemporaneous tax funding of any expenditure the benefits 
of which are entirely enjoyed contemporaneously, but it rejects the proposition that 
capital expenditure should as a matter of principle be tax-financed at the time it is 
undertaken. Instead, it asserts that the costs associated with capital expenditure should 
be spread over time in accordance with the distribution over time of the benefits 
which that capital expenditure generates. It defends, within limits, the use of debt and 
other financial liabilities for this purpose. The golden rule has long roots in public 
finance practice. Perhaps its most notable recent manifestation has been in the UK, 
where the incoming Blair Labor government explicitly adopted the golden rule as its 
primary medium-term fiscal policy principle (UK Treasury, 1997). 
 
To proponents of the golden rule, the accrual operating result is of great importance 
because it is the principle indicator of the intergenerational equity stance of fiscal 
policy. The golden rule requires that governments achieve a balanced accrual 
budget in other words, a zero operating result on average over the course of the 
business cycle (Robinson, 1998). If one were to disregard revaluations, a zero 
operating balance requirement could be expressed as a ‘constant net worth’ rule: or, 
more precisely, as a requirement that (real) public sector net assets should be 
maintained constant over the business cycle.  7
In the 1999-2000 budget, the Commonwealth announced a number of new 
supplementary fiscal objectives, one of which was ‘improving the Commonwealth’s 
net assets position over the medium to long term’ (Treasury, 1999a: 1.15, 1.19). From 
the golden rule perspective, the pursuit of increasing net assets implies undue imposts 
upon current generations, and reflects what the federal Treasury correctly identified in 
1995 as a misconceived ‘presumption that increases in net worth are good’ (Treasury, 
1995: 5). 
 
From the golden rule perspective, then, it is the operating result rather than fiscal 
balance which measures the intergenerational equity stance of fiscal policy. There 
remains, however, the question of the role of fiscal balance with respect to fiscal 
sustainability and national savings policy. The issue of fiscal sustainability is 
considered briefly further below, following discussion of certain issues related to the 
measurement of the operating result. National savings policy will not, however, be 
discussed, other than to say that, even if one believes that it is desirable on national 
savings grounds for the current taxpayers to make some contribution to the financing 
of net investment, it is hard to find any credible rationale for a policy of requiring 
current taxpayers to finance, as a matter of principle, all net public investment. Yet 
that is precisely what a policy of zero fiscal balance requires. Such a policy tends to 
result in the continued erosion of the public capital stock, or alternatively to lead to a 
pursuit of private financing of public infrastructure for reasons of financial appearance 
rather than efficiency. These issues, have, however, been subject to considerable 
discussion over recent years, and there is no need to rehearse them further here. 
 
5. Measuring the Operating Result 
 
Because from the golden rule perspective the operating result is such a crucial fiscal 
indicator, defining it properly is a matter of considerable importance. The significant 
difference between GFS and AAS 31 operating result concepts is therefore of some 
relevance. As mentioned above, the GFS net operating result and AAS 31 operating 
result before abnormals differ in their treatment of revaluations. GFS treats 
revaluations as an abnormal, whereas AAS 31 does not. The same methodological 
difference also arises in the treatment of profit/loss on sale of assets, which AAS 31 
(by contrast to GFS) treats as a revenue item contributing to the operating result. 
 
In justifying the exclusion of revaluations from the GFS net operating result, the ABS 
observes (1997: 9) that ‘revaluations are largely outside a government’s direct 
control’. This is certainly true of revaluations due to the impact of changing interest 
rate and exchange rates upon debt. Such revaluation are not only volatile, but 
potentially reversible over relatively short time periods. The distortionary impact of 
revaluations in an accrual context can, however, be much greater than the impact upon 
debt alone. Revaluations of physical assets can be large, and this is particularly the 
case when so-called ‘deprival value’ asset valuation methodology is employed. Some 
of these revaluations are not necessarily outside the government’s direct control at all. 
A striking example of this can be seen in the Commonwealth’s 1999-2000 accounts, 
in which the operating result was ‘improved’ by revaluations of almost $10 billion. 
The bulk of this $10 billion was accounted for by marking up of the Government’s 
Telstra shareholding from book to market value, pursuant upon the planned 
privatisation (Treasury, 1999a: 1.20, 9.36).  8
From the ‘golden rule’ perspective, the inclusion of revaluations in the calculation of 
the operating result is manifestly a problem. To pursue a policy of balancing the 
accrual budget in the presence of significant revaluations would require that taxes (or 
current expenditure) be raised or lowered at short notice to offset revaluations 
(Robinson, 1998: 456). In the context of the Telstra privatisation, for example, to 
measure the operating result in such a manner while applying the golden rule would 
imply that the upward revaluation of Telstra shares be treated as the equivalent of 
ordinary tax revenue, and thus as revenue which could legitimately be spent 
immediately on consumption items. However, it is not only from the golden rule 
perspective that revaluations are a problem. It is, as noted above, precisely because 
revaluations are seen as a potential distortion of the underlying fiscal stance that they 
have been excluded from the Treasury’s fiscal balance measure. Amongst economist, 
then, there would appear to be a considerable degree of agreement that revaluations 
are best regarded as a potential source of ‘noise’ in the operating statement which 
should be excluded, along the lines of the GFS treatment
5. The logic of the AAS 31 
treatment of revaluations is, by contrast, something a mystery. 
 
As noted above, AAS 31 includes profit/loss on sale of assets in the operating result, 
whereas the GFS does not. It can be argued that this also is quite inappropriate, 
although space does permit the issue to be properly addressed here. One of the major 
arguments advanced over recent years for the move to accrual financial reporting in 
the public sector has been the elimination of distortions and abuses related to asset 
sales transactions. It is therefore somewhat ironic that, while on the one hand the cash 
balance was adjusted to produce an underlying measure which excluded asset sales 
effects, we now have an accrual operating result into which asset sales distortions 
have been inappropriately and quite unnecessarily reintroduced as a result of the 
inappropriate recognition of both profit/loss on sale of asset and revaluations. 
 
It will, incidentally, also be noted that, although revaluations have been netted off in 
the derivation of the Commonwealth’s fiscal balance measure, the same is not true of 
profit/loss on sale of assets. It is conceivable that this could become significant at 
some stage in the future. 
 
The adoption of AAS 31 has no doubt been driven by a preference for consistency 
with private sector accounting practice. Yet accrual financial reporting the primary 
function of which in the private sector is to report profit necessarily performs a 
significantly different role in the non-profit public sector. Public sector accrual 
methodology ought to reflect this, rather than a pursuit of consistency with ‘generally 
accepted accounting standards’ as if this were an objective in its own right. It is 
somewhat curious, given this pursuit of consistency with private sector practice, that 
the accounting standard makers have at the same time so forcefully (and successfully) 
advocated the entirely inappropriate (Mayston, 1992; Robinson, 1998) ‘deprival 
value’ asset valuation methodology within the public sector, given that deprival value 
methodology is a close relative of the ‘operating capital maintenance’ concept which 





6. Fiscal Sustainability, Fiscal Balance and Net Financial Liabilities 
 
We return now to the role of fiscal balance and of its stock counterpart, net financial 
liabilities as a medium-term fiscal policy indicator. Consistent with the analysis 
above, the term ‘operating result’ will from this point on be taken to refer to the GFS 
operating result measure (ie excluding revaluations and profit/loss on asset sales). 
Given this, it is precisely (rather than appropoximately) the case that 
 
Operating Result = Fiscal Balance + Net Investment 
 
It is obvious then that the golden rule implies not that the (structural) fiscal balance 
should equal zero, but that it should be equal in magnitude but opposite in sign to net 
public investment. This is simply to say that increases in net financial liabilites are 
acceptable from the intergenerational equity perspective only as a means of financing 
net investment. Thus, although the golden rule is commonly articulated as a 
stipulation that debt be used only for financing of capital expenditure, ‘debt’ in this 
context should be thought of simply as shorthand for net financial liabilities. 
 
Thus in term of intergenerational equity, fiscal balance should not to be regarded as a 
headline fiscal indicator. There remain, however, the other two key medium-term 
fiscal goals of fiscal sustainability and the enhancement of national savings. 
 
Advocates of the golden rule recognise that achieving a balanced accrual budget does 
not guarantee fiscal sustainability, and that it is therefore necessary to set explicit 
fiscal sustainability rules. One simple approach to this, which has been employed by 
the Blair Government, has been to stipulate that the ratio of net debt/GDP should not 
exceed some specific moderate ceiling. The idea is that net debt measures net non-
discretionary financial commitments, while GDP acts as a proxy measure for the tax 
base from which these commitments must be met. The British have labelled this the 
‘sustainable investment’ rule (UK Treasury, 1999). 
 
This approach to assuring fiscal sustainability has merit, yet it is clearly somewhat 
inadequate. The logic of using net debt rather than gross debt as a fiscal sustainability 
measure is that if the government holds cash or private sector bonds, then these can be 
considered to offset some of its own debt. The case for such netting off is clear 
enough. However, governments also typically hold other type of assets which entitle 
them to receive cash flows in future, such as publicly traded shares. These also should 
be netted off. And, as accrual accounting highlights, there are also quasi-debt 
liabilities such as superannuation, which are just as significant from a fiscal 
sustainability point of view as is debt proper. The clear implication of this is that net 
financial liabilities is superior to net debt as a fiscal sustainability measure, and that it 
would be better to specify a British-style ‘sustainable investment’ rule in terms of the 
ratio of net financial liabilities/GDP. 
 
This is not, however, to suggest that net financial liabilities is a comprehensive fiscal 
sustainability measure. The net financial liabilities measure does not include the 
expected future earnings of government business enterprises, and it is clearly 
unjustifiable to disregard the extent of a government’s portfolio of business 
enterprises in assessing fiscal sustainability. It would therefore in principle be better to  10
use net financial liabilities minus the financial value of public enterprises in assessing 
fiscal sustainability. However, at a practical level, determining the financial value of 
public enterprises is a highly subjective matter
6, and the production of such a broader 
measure is not a practical proposition
7. It therefore makes sense to employ the ratio of 
net financial liabilities/GDP as the principle fiscal sustainability indicator, while 
bearing in mind the significance of public enterprise earnings. In any event, as 




From this perspective, it is an unfortunate aspect of the form of accrual financial 
reporting which has been implemented in Australia that it does not explicitly report 
net financial liabilities on the balance sheet. It is, moreover, somewhat paradoxical 
that, while inappropriately neglecting this stock measure in favour of a continued 
primary preoccupation with net debt, decision makers are at the same time unduly 




The shift to an accrual basis represents a radical change in budget-sector government 
accounting. For advocates of the ‘golden rule’, this shift represents a golden 
opportunity to shift the emphasis of medium-term fiscal policy from a simplistic 
pursuit of debt elimination, to a more balanced focus upon intergenerational equity 
and fiscal responsibility. Concretely, such a policy shift would be expressed in the 
replacement of the former rule of structural underlying cash budget balance with a 
new rule of structural accrual balance. Instead, there has been a shift at the 
Commonwealth level to a new ‘fiscal balance’ headline measure. The watchword has 
been policy continuity rather than policy change. Notwithstanding this, it may be that 
the shift from targeting cash balance to fiscal balance will in time imply some 
tightening of fiscal policy.  
 
There are significant differences between the GFS and AAS 31 treatments of 
revaluations and asset sales. The former is conceptually appropriate, whereas the latter 
is not. The Commonwealth Treasury has, to its credit, responded to this by eliminating 
revaluations in the derivation of the fiscal balance. This does not, however, deal with 
the problem at source, and does not help those who regard the operating balance as a 
key fiscal variable in its own right. 
 
It will take time for the new accrual concepts to become widely understood in the 
community. This process will not be assisted by the existence of such significant 
differences GFS and AAS 31. Prior to the move to full accrual accounting, the 
accounting formats employed in budgets had to a large degree been harmonised with 
the GFS format, resulting in a great improvement in fiscal transparency. The new 
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1  Net debt measures the excess of assets over liabilities in respect to bonds and holdings of money. 
2 The accuracy of this statement is unaffected by certain netting out which took place within the GFS 
‘cash’ accounting presentation (namely, the netting out from expenditure of receipts from the sale of  12
                                                                                                                                            
goods and services, so as to produce the ‘outlays’ concept; and the netting of certain capital receipts to 
produce ‘gross fixed capital expenditure’). It is irrelevant to the bottom line whether such receipts are as 
negative expenditures or as revenue. 
3  In 1997-98, the ABS introduced the ‘underlying’ cash balance which deducted net advances 
(including asset sale receipts) from the cash balance as its headline measure. The practice of adjusting 
the cash budget balance for the impact of privatisation receipts was also adopted in most states by the 
mid-1990s. 
4 This clearly conflates time-periods with ‘generations’, which is inappropriate in the real world where 
generations overlap. It can nevertheless be demonstrated that the golden rule represents a 
approximation of intergenerational equity principles with the great virtue of practicability in a world of 
uncertainty and high information costs (Robinson, 1996). 
5 Having said this, it may be noted that there is one potential exception to this principle, which perhaps 
merits closer examination elsewhere. This is the element of revaluations which reflects gains due to the 
changes in the price level. The reduction is the real value of net debt due to inflation is, for example, 
part of the ‘revaluation’ figure. To the extent that inflation tends to be more expected than unexpected, 
it could be argued that such gains out to be recognised in the operating result.  
6  The ‘value’ placed upon public enterprises in a whole-of-government balance sheet does not even 
purport to measure their net present value. 
7  It is also inherently ambigous if some of those enterprises possess unexploited monopoly power. 
8 The broader ‘deficiency’ of the net financial liabilities measure is obviously that it omits future 
discretionary (ie policy-determined) expenditure and revenue flows, and cannot therefore purport to be 
a a comprehensive measure of fiscal sustainability in the manner of, say, Buiter’s (1990) ideal balance 
sheet (or, indeed, of the so-called ‘generational accounts’ (Auerbach et al, 1994)). There are, however, 
major practicality problems with such theoretically comprehensive measures. Moreover, it does matter 
quite considerably whether, say, an expenditure obligation is of a non-discretionary type (such as debt-
servicing, accounts payable or contractual commitments to pay outsourced service providers) or 
whether, by contrast, it is discretionary program expenditure. 